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Abstract—Intel SGX has been a popular trusted execution en-
vironment (TEE) for protecting the integrity and confidentiality
of applications running on untrusted platforms such as cloud.
However, the access patterns of SGX-based programs can still be
observed by adversaries, which may leak important information
for successful attacks. Researchers have been experimenting
with Oblivious RAM (ORAM) to address the privacy of access
patterns. ORAM is a powerful low-level primitive that provides
application-agnostic protection for any I/O operations, however,
at a high cost. We find that some application-specific access
patterns, such as sequential block I/O, do not provide additional
information to adversaries. Others, such as sorting, can be
replaced with specific oblivious algorithms that are more efficient
than ORAM. The challenge is that developers may need to
look into all the details of application-specific access patterns
to design suitable solutions, which is time-consuming and error-
prone. In this paper, we present the lightweight SGX based
MapReduce (SGX-MR) approach that regulates the dataflow
of data-intensive SGX applications for easier application-level
access-pattern analysis and protection. It uses the MapReduce
framework to cover a large class of data-intensive applications,
and the entire framework can be implemented with a small
memory footprint. With this framework, we have examined the
stages of data processing, identified the access patterns that need
protection, and designed corresponding efficient protection meth-
ods. Our experiments show that SGX-MR based applications are
much more efficient than the ORAM-based implementations.
Index Terms—SGX-based data analytics, MapReduce, Data
flow regularization, Access Patterns, ORAM
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of resource-starving applications in
big data, artificial intelligence, and the Internet of Things
(IoT), cloud computing has become popular for its storage,
computation scalability, and accessibility. However, when up-
loading data and conducting computations in the cloud, data
owners lose full control of their data and must trust that
service providers can take care of security well. In practice,
due to the wide attack surface of the cloud software stack
and the unique co-tenancy feature [25], we have witnessed
frequent cloud security incidents. Practitioners using public
clouds have experienced at least one cloud-related security
incident, and more than 93% of organizations are moderately
or extremely concerned about cloud security. The challenge is
how to improve cloud security and make data owners more
confident in using public clouds.
*To appear in 21st Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium
(PETS’2021)
Researchers have been experimenting with novel crypto
approaches, such as fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)
[4] and secure multi-party computation (SMC) [13], [20],
to address this problem. However, such pure software-based
cryptographic solutions are still too expensive to be practical.
Their overheads in storage, communication, and computation
can be in many orders of magnitudes higher than the plain-
text solutions. Recent advances in hybrid protocols, e.g., for
machine learning [20], [21], [29], strive to reduce the overall
costs of the frameworks by blending multiple crypto primitives
to implement different algorithmic components. Although we
have seen several close-to-practical solutions [20], [29], they
are specifically designed for a particular problem or algorithm
and difficult to generalize and optimize for new domains.
During the past five years, the trusted execution environment
(TEE) has emerged as a more efficient approach to addressing
the performance and usability issues in secure outsourced
computation. It provides hardware support to create an isolated
environment within the cloud server that cannot even be
compromised by adversaries who control the entire system
software stack, including the operating system. Intel Software
Guard Extension (SGX) [8] is probably the most well-known
TEE hardware and SDK implementation. Since 2015, SGX has
been available in most Intel CPUs. Using SGX, a user can run
their sensitive computations in a TEE called enclave, which
uses a hardware-assisted mechanism to preserve the privacy
and integrity of enclave memory. With SGX, users can pass
encrypted data into the enclave, decrypt it, compute with plain
text data, encrypt the result, and return it to the untrusted cloud
components.
SGX aims to protect the confidentiality and integrity of
the in-enclave data, code, and computation. While it provides
much better performance than expensive pure software-based
crypto approaches, it leaks interactions and access patterns
between the untrusted area and the enclave. Recent studies
[10], [27], [36] show that some data access patterns may reveal
application-level information to adversaries, even though the
data blocks on the untrusted memory are encrypted. Thus,
several efforts [1], [27] adopt the concept of oblivious RAM
(ORAM) [12] to address the access-pattern leakage problem.
While ORAM is a generic solution covering all types of SGX
applications by protecting each I/O access, it incurs high costs.
With the state of the art ORAM schemes so far [32], [33],
each block access still comes with an additional O(logN)
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overhead, with N numbers of blocks in the pool. Furthermore,
for data-intensive applications, the data to be processed is
normally larger than the limited physical enclave memory (i.e.,
the Enclave Page Cache) [8]. Thus, page swapping happens
frequently, which can be precisely captured by adversaries via
observing page fault interrupts [31] to infer the access pattern
of sensitive data.
A. Scope of Our Research
While ORAM provides a generic primitive for hiding data
access patterns for all I/O operations, we find that it is unnec-
essary to hide sequential, uniform, and completely random
I/O patterns, especially for data-intensive applications. For
example, sequentially reading or writing a block file does not
reveal additional information about the file content. However,
the ORAM based I/O interface does not distinguish the dif-
ferent types of application patterns to treat them differently.
Developers can certainly carefully examine each step in their
applications to decide to use (or not to use) the ORAM
operation. However, it is time-consuming and error-prone.
Developers who are not familiar with the access-pattern attacks
may accidentally mishandle or simply overlook some I/O
accesses. We hypothesize that for many data-intensive algo-
rithms, e.g., data mining algorithms, regulating the dataflow
of the application and focusing on protecting specific access
patterns can be more efficient than using the ORAM primitive
for all I/O accesses. We propose a framework: SGX-MR to au-
tomatically regulate the data flow of data-intensive applications
and protect access patterns without depending on the expensive
ORAM primitive or scrupulous examination and design by
developers. The proposed approach protects not only the data
access patterns from the untrusted memory but also record-
level access patterns within the enclave threatened by page-
fault attacks [31]. SGX-MR provides all of these benefits while
keeping the low-level details transparent to the developers.
Our idea is to take the MapReduce framework [9] to regulate
data-intensive SGX application dataflows, and then examine
the stages of MapReduce processing to address their access
pattern leakages. This approach has several advantages. (1)
Since the dataflow in MapReduce processing is fixed for all
MapReduce applications, it is more efficient for us to analyze
each stage’s access pattern, identify possible access-pattern
leakages, and apply more efficient oblivious methods than
ORAM. Using this systematic approach, it is possible to cover
a large number of potential applications. (2) The MapReduce
framework is easy to use and has been applied to numerous
data-intensive problems, e.g., data mining [18], machine learn-
ing [6], text processing [16], and basic statistics. Researchers
and practitioners have accumulated extensive experience [6],
[17], [18] for solving most data analytics problems with the
MapReduce framework during the past decade. Furthermore,
Roy et al. [26] also show that certain types of aggregate
reducers with user-defined mapper functions will be sufficient
to support a large class of data mining algorithms, including
clustering, predictive modeling, and recommenders. SGX-MR
strategically uses this finding to facilitate a wide range of
data analytics while leveraging SGXs features in solving the
related confidentiality and integrity concerns. Therefore, SGX-
MR provides a versatile framework/tool for developers to
implement wide range of data mining algorithms without
having to worry about confidentiality and integrity concerns.
Note that it is well known that applications requiring random
accesses of data or low latency processing may not match the
design purpose of MapReduce. Accordingly, SGX-MR will
not be a good candidate for such applications.
We have carefully designed the whole SGX-MR framework
to minimize the attack surface [30] and achieve the best
performance as possible. Specifically, our research has the
following contributions.
• We have implemented the lightweight SGX-MR frame-
work that is flexible to adapt to the restricted enclave
memory, data volume, and computation complexity.
• We have carefully studied both the access patterns outside
and inside the enclave during each stage of the SGX-
MR framework and designed robust mitigation methods
to prevent access pattern leakages.
• We have conducted extensive component-wise experi-
ments to understand the cost and performance of the
SGX-MR framework with the ORAM based SGX ap-
proach. The result shows that SGX-MR can be several
times faster than ORAM based solutions.
In the remaining sections, we will first give the background
knowledge for our approach (Section II), then dive in the
details of the proposed approach (Section III), present the
evaluation result (Section V), and described the closely related
work (Section VI).
II. PRELIMINARY
We will present the related background knowledge before
we dive into our approach, including the way SGX manages
the enclave memory and related issues, the ORAM approach
to addressing the known access-pattern attacks, and a brief
introduction to MapReduce framework.
A. Enclave Memory Management
Due to the hardware implementation cost, Intel SGX only
reserves 128 MB of physical memory, known as Processor
Reserved Memory (PRM). A certain portion of PRM has been
used for maintaining SGX’s internal operations. The remaining
portion, about 90MB known as the Enclave Page Cache (EPC),
can be used by the enclave programs. In the Linux systems,
SGX can utilize the Linux virtual memory management for
enclave programs, which can thus access a much larger virtual
memory address space with contingency for potential page-
faults. When a page-fault interrupt happens, the SGX driver
will encrypt the selected EPC page and swap it out to the
untrusted memory area. This memory management brings two
concerns. First, since the SGX driver mostly uses the kernel’s
SGX-MR does not support the join operation yet, which will be examined
for full performance and privacy guarantee in the future.
We will open-source the SGX-MR framework after we finalize the devel-
opment.
functions for page-fault handling, which an adversarial kernel
can manipulate to issue targeted page-fault attack [31]. Shinde
et al. [31] have shown such an attack can help adversaries learn
the in-enclave access patterns over the EPC pages. Second, It
is unknown how efficient the inherent SGX virtual memory
management works in applications. Arnautov et al. [2] show
system-managed EPC page swapping incurs significant costs
when handling data larger than the limit of enclave memory.
We have also experimentally confirmed this observation. We
also designed a block-buffer based application memory man-
agement to minimize the memory access pattern. However,
due to the large processed data, the application-managed
buffer also needs frequent swapping out blocks explicitly,
showing no significant performance advantage over implicit
system page swapping, as we show in experiments. Thus, for
simplicity, a data-intensive application can just use the system
virtual memory mechanism, e.g., by setting a sufficiently large
enclave heap size. This also gives some flexibility for handling
other issues like large objects.
B. Access-Pattern Based Attacks and ORAM for SGX
When encrypted messages are either accessed from memory
or exchanged via the network, an adversary can observe the
dataflow and possibly extract sensitive information. Cash et
al. [5] and Zhang et al. [35] have shown how an adversary
can extract the content of encrypted documents by lever-
aging access pattern leakages. Ohrimenko et al. [22] have
also demonstrated how sensitive information, such as age-
group, birthplace, marital status, etc., can be extracted from
MapReduce programs by only observing the network flow and
memory skew.
While SGX can protect the content in the enclave memory
from an adversarial OS, it does not provide a systematic
mechanism to protect against access pattern leakages. When
the program inside the enclave accesses the untrusted memory,
the adversarial OS can always monitor the accessed memory
addresses. Furthermore, adversaries can modify the virtual
memory management mechanism to manipulate the page-
fault interrupt generation to figure out in-enclave page access
patterns [31].
Consider an example where a pharmaceutical company
wants to find top sold items last month by analyzing the daily
transactions in the cloud. As sales information is sensitive,
they do not want to reveal any statistics from the transactions.
Hence in a secure setting, data remains encrypted in untrusted
memory and only decrypted in a trusted enclave during com-
putation. A simple way is to use Hashmap to collect the counts
of sold items: each item is mapped to a key, which is associated
to a key-count pair located at a fixed memory address; each
time an item is observed, the corresponding memory address
is visited to update the corresponding count. Without access
pattern protection, an adversarial OS can observe the memory
page access pattern, which can be used to infer the number
of a certain item accesses. This access pattern can be used to
estimate the number of medicine types, the count of certain
medicine, and the total number of sold items.
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Fig. 1: Oblivious block retrieval from the ORAM Tree. The
entire path containing the target block is loaded into the
enclave to hide the access pattern. Furthermore, the CMOV
instruction is used to hide the in-enclave access of the target
block to address the page-fault attack.
Researchers have applied the idea of Oblivious RAM
(ORAM) [12] to protect the block-level access patterns for
SGX applications [1], [27]. ORAM primarily retrieves multi-
ple memory blocks in a path and then randomly shuffles mem-
ory blocks periodically to disguise read/write access patterns
on encrypted data blocks, where an adversary cannot learn
additional information by observing memory access patterns.
ORAM was originally developed for theoretical treatment
for software protection [12], and then actively studied for
protecting remote access patterns for cloud-based applications
[32], [33] to address the privacy concerns with untrusted cloud
service providers. By leveraging the ORAM construction,
SGX applications can protect the access pattern of untrusted
memory from the adversarial OS. The current SGX ORAM
methods also partially address the in-enclave page-fault attack
on ORAM-related operations. As shown by Figure 1, the
popular SGX ORAM solutions, such as ZeroTrace [27] and
Obliviate [1], utilize the most efficient Path ORAM [32] or
Circuit ORAM [33], which uses a tree structure and paths from
the root to the leaves to hide the actual accessed block. The tree
and data blocks are maintained in the untrusted area. Once the
path containing the target block is identified, it is loaded into
the enclave for the enclave program to extract the target block.
However, adversaries may monitor page faults to figure out
which block in the path is finally accessed. CMOV instruction
[23], [24] is a CPU instruction that moves the source operand
to destination if a conditional flag is set. Regardless the flag
is set or not, the source operand will be read. Therefore, the
occurrence of page fault cannot be used to infer whether the
source is copied to the destination or not. A simplified example
is shown as follows:
//if (a < b) x = a else x = b
CMOVL x, a
CMOVGE x, b
Consider a and b as two sources we want to protect (e.g., the
blocks in the ORAM path, as shown in Figure 1). We want
to hide the actual access pattern, say, copying b to the buffer
x. If the comparison result is true, the copy happens with the
CMOVL (move if less) line, otherwise with the CMOVGE
(move if greater or equal) line. For both lines, the sources
a and b are read regardless of the condition is true or not.
As the ORAM controller’s vital data structures, such as the
position map and stash, will be kept inside the enclave, the in-
enclave access patterns about the position map and stash may
also be under the page-fault attacks. Similar approaches have
been used to hide these data-dependent page access patterns.
However, as a lower level block I/O interface, SGX ORAM
cannot address application-specific page-fault attacks.
C. MapReduce
MapReduce [9] is a popular programming model and also
a processing framework, designed to handle large-scale data
with a massively-parallel processing infrastructure. It has
several major computation phases: map, optional combiner,
shuffle and reduce. The input data is split into fixed-size
blocks. Running in parallel, each Mapper takes the user-
defined “map” function to process one assigned data block
and converts it to key-value pairs. An optional combiner can
be used to pre-aggregate the map outputs, if hierarchical
aggregation works for the reduce function. Then, all output
key-value pairs of mapper (or combiners if they are used)
are sorted, grouped, and partitioned individually for Reducers
to fetch. Each Reducer then fetches the corresponding share
of Map (or Combiner) output in the shuffling phase. After
collecting all shares, each Reducer sorts them. Finally, each
Reducer applies the user-defined reduce function to process
each group of key-value pairs to generate the final result. In
both map and reduce phases, multiple processes (Mappers and
Reducers) are run in parallel on distributed computing nodes
to achieve high throughputs. Noticing the regulated dataflow
in MapReduce processing and the extensive experience in de-
veloping MapReduce applications accumulated during the past
few years [6], [17], [18], we decide to apply this processing
framework to the SGX-based data-intensive applications. By
addressing the access pattern leakages in this framework, we
can protect a large number of applications using our SGX-MR
framework.
III. THE SGX-MR APPROACH
Starting with an analysis of the typical data flow for data
analytics algorithms in the SGX enclave context, we present
the SGX-MR framework to integrate MapReduce processing
into the SGX enclave environment. Then, we describe the tar-
get threat model and analyze possible access pattern leakages
under the SGX-MR framework. We will design mitigation
methods to address these access pattern leakages.
A. Features of SGX-Based Data Analytics Algorithms and
Threat Model
Typical data analytics applications handle datasets much
larger than the enclave memory and often they are sequentially
scanned in multiple iterations. Using SGX for data analyt-
ics applications has several unique features. For simplicity,
datasets are often organized in encrypted blocks and stored in
a block-file structure. For security reasons, the SGX enclave
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Fig. 2: High-level diagram of SGX-MR: shaded modules or
memory either executed in the enclave or remain encrypted.
program that runs in the protected EPC area cannot access
the file system APIs directly. When processed, they are first
loaded into the main (untrusted) memory, and then passed to
the enclave via SGX APIs. Encrypted data blocks will be de-
crypted and processed inside the enclave. In this process, there
are two security challenges. (1) Adversaries can observe the
interactions between the untrusted memory and the enclave.
Thus, preserving this access pattern is essential, which has
been addressed by ORAM-based approaches, but appears too
expensive. (2) Large data processing in enclave will inevitably
cause data spill out, either handled implicitly by the system’s
page swapping mechanism, or explicitly by applications, e.g.,
via buffer management. Adversaries can also observe or even
manipulate page faults to obtain in-enclave access patterns.
Threat Model. Based on the analysis of the features of
SGX-based data analytics algorithms, we derive the following
threat model. 1)An adversary may compromise the operating
system and any hypervisor of the host running the SGX
applications. However, it cannot compromise the SGX hard-
ware and enclaves. 2)The adversary may observe all of the
data, program executions, and memory management of the
system outside the SGX enclaves. It can thus analyze and
detect interaction patterns between SGX enclave process and
the untrusted memory. 3) A malicious adversary may tamper
the application data and program running in the untrusted
memory. 4) A powerful adversary may manipulate the data
and program execution in the untrusted memory to force
page faults within enclave to obtain in-enclave memory access
patterns. 5) Denial-of-service and the side-channel attacks
based on power analysis, or timing attacks [11], are out of
the scope of this paper.
We refer to the basic SGX mechanism [8] for integrity and
confidentiality protection. We encrypt the code and data in
the untrusted region of our framework with sgx crypto, a
cryptographic library provided by Intel SGX SDK with robust
security protection. We design the MapReduce framework and
associated algorithms in such a manner that the page-fault
attacks inside the enclave and the enclave’s access patterns to
the untrusted memory are oblivious from the adversary.
B. Design of SGX-MR
According to the SGX working mechanism and features of
data-intensive applications, we partition the entire framework
into two parts, i.e., the trusted (enclave) and untrusted parts.
Figure 2 shows the components. The untrusted part contains
the user-uploaded encrypted data and the small block I/O
library. The remaining components of the SGX-MR framework
reside in the enclave.
• Untrusted Part. Since the data and the I/O library are
in the untrusted area, our design needs to address both
their confidentiality and integrity. We design a block file
structure for encrypted data on disk and in the untrusted
memory area. For simplicity, we assume that data records
have a fixed size. Both block size and record size are
tunable by the user based on the specific application.
Each block also contains a message authentication code
(MAC) to ensure data integrity. The whole block is
encrypted systematically using the AES Counter (CTR)
mode functions in the SGX SDK. To minimize the attack
surface, we design the library running in the untrusted
part to handle only block I/O, and a verification function
inside the block data manager in the enclave to capture
any adversarial modification on the loaded data blocks.
• Enclave Part. The SGX-MR controller handles MapRe-
duce jobs and controls the dataflow of the application.
Users only provide the map(), reduce(), and combine()
functions to implement the application-specific process-
ing. For simplicity, we will focus on the aggregation-
style combine and reduce functions, such as COUNT,
MAX, MIN, SUM, TOP-K, etc., which have been shown
sufficient to handle many data analytics tasks [26]. Re-
markably, with our careful design, the binary of the whole
SGX-MR framework (without the application-specific
map, combine, and reduce functions) takes only about
1.1MB physical memory. With the manually managed
memory, we can also work with EPC memory as small
as 3–4 blocks. The block size may depend on the specific
application (we use block sizes varying from 2 KB to 2
MB for both WordCount and kMeans application in our
experiment).
1) Dataflow Regularization in SGX-MR: With a basic
understanding of the components in SGX-MR, we describe
how the application dataflow is regulated, which helps sim-
plify access-pattern analysis and protection. While the orig-
inal MapReduce is designed for parallel processing, Figure
3 sketches how the dataflow regulated by the MapReduce
processing pipeline and processed sequentially in SGX-MR,
and the interactions between the enclave and the untrusted
memory. First of all, input files are processed by the data
owner, encoded with the block format via a file encoding utility
tool, and uploaded to the target machine running the SGX-MR
application. Second, within a MapReduce job, all file access
requests from the enclave (i.e., mapper reading and reducer
writing) have to go through the SGX-MR block I/O module
running in the untrusted memory area. Third, the intermediate
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Fig. 3: Regulated dataflows between enclave and main memory
outputs, e.g., of the Map, Combiner, and Sorting phases, can
also be spilled out either by application buffer manager or
system’s virtual memory manager, in encrypted form.
Specifically, after the job starts, the Map module will read
encrypted data blocks sequentially from the untrusted memory
area, decrypt them, and apply the user-provided map function
to process the records iteratively, which generates the output in
key-value pairs. Note that the formats of both the input records
and the generated key-value pairs are defined by users for
the specific application (for readers who are not familiar with
MapReduce programming, please refer to Section II and the
original paper [9]). The controller accumulates the generated
key-value records until they fill up a block, and then sort them
by the key. With strictly managed memory, the filled data block
will be written to the untrusted area temporarily. If we depend
on the virtual memory management, the filled data blocks will
stay in the enclave memory and swapped out by the system
when needed. We have evaluated both options in experiments
and found that application-managed memory has performance
advantages. Since we have restricted the reducer functions to
a set of hierarchically aggregatable functions (i.e., aggregates
can be done locally and then globally), we also design their
combiner functions for local aggregation. For example, for the
COUNT function, the combiner will generate the local counts
for a key, say ki: ((ki, c1), (ki, c2), . . . , (ki, cm)) if there are
m mappers. The reduce phase will get the final counts of∑m
j=1 cj . The inclusion of combiner has two benefits: (1) it
can significantly reduce the cost of the most expensive phase:
sorting, and (2) it can indirectly address the group size leakage
problem in the reduce phase that will be discussed later.
The Combiner outputs will go through the sorting phase,
where the sorting algorithm will sort all key-value pairs into
groups uniquely identified by the key. The Reduce phase then
iteratively processed the groups of key-value pairs identified
by the key.
Like the Map phase, key-value pairs stored in blocks will
be handled sequentially in the Reduce phase. Specifically, the
user-selected reduce function from the library takes a group
of records with the same key and generates aggregated results.
For all the aggregation functions we mentioned earlier, a
sequential scan over the group will be sufficient to generate
the aggregates. The aggregate of each group is also in the
form of key-value pairs, which are accumulated in data blocks,
encrypted, and written back to the untrusted area. The above
described dataflow keeps the same for all applications that
can be cast into the MapReduce processing framework. Now,
by specifically addressing the potential access-pattern leakages
in the MapReduce data flow, we can effectively protect a
broad category of data-intensive SGX applications from access
pattern related attacks.
2) Block Design: We fix the record size and records per
block to avoid variable length records leaking additional infor-
mation. Active adversaries can observe the record-level access
pattern via page-fault attacks, which allows them to identify
record length. Fixed-length records can effectively address this
problem, with a cost of padding for short records. One may
concern about the efficiency of handling extra-large record that
exceeds the limit of the physical enclave memory (e.g., > 100
MB) . We admit the padding will take a significant extra cost,
but the limit of enclave memory may not be a concern. By
adjusting the enclave heap size to sufficiently accommodate
blocks, the system’s virtual memory management can handle
well — in this case, we prefer not using the application-
managed buffer. Experiments have shown the performance
difference between different memory management strategies
is ignorable.
3) Integrity Guarantee: While SGX assures the integrity of
enclave memory, both code and data that reside in untrusted
memory remain vulnerable and can be modified. SGX-MR
minimizes untrusted execution that was only used for storing
and retrieving block data from untrusted memory. The integrity
of the untrusted execution will be verified inside the enclave.
We consider three possible attacks to integrity: (1) modify
a block, (2) shuffle a block with another block in the same
file, and (3) insert a block from a different file (or a phase’s
output that is encrypted with the same key). To address all
the attacks, we include the following attributes in the block:
(i) Block ID, so that block shuffling can be identified, (ii)
File Id, so that no block from different files can be inserted,
and (iii) the block-level Message Authentication Code (MAC).
At the end of each block, a MAC is attached to guarantee
the integrity of records, before the whole block is encrypted.
We also use the randomized encryption using AES-CTR
encoding to make sure the same block will be encrypted to a
totally non-distinguishable one so that adversaries cannot trace
the generated results in the MapReduce workflow. A simple
verification program runs inside the enclave that verifies the
IDs and MAC, after reading and decrypting a block.
IV. ACCESS-PATTERN LEAKAGES AND MITIGATION
METHODS
Based on the SGX-MR dataflow analysis, we can identify
several critical data access patterns pertaining to different
phases: Map’s input, intermediate processing, combining, and
output; Shuffling/Sorting’s input, sorting, and output; and
Reduce’s input, aggregation, and output. Among these access
patterns, Map’s input and Reduce’s output involve only se-
quential block reads/writes. Thus, individually they do not
leak additional information except for input and output file
sizes (i.e., the number of blocks). However, Reducer’s output,
if observed synchronously with its input, may reveal some
information as we show in the following. In this section
Merge
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Fig. 4: Access-pattern leakage in MergeSort by observing the
interactions between the enclave program and the untrusted
memory. If R4 ≤ L1, then the Merge Phase reads R1 to R4
one by one to write sorted output and then reads L1 to L4.
By observing this reading pattern (movement of the pointers),
the adversary will learn that the entire right sub-list is smaller
than the left sub-list.
we examine the access pattern leakages in different stages
of SGX-MR and discuss the mitigation methods. First, we
described leakage in sorting, followed by leakages by page
faults, and finally the leakages in the reducing phase of the
framework.
A. Leakage in Sorting
We start with the most expensive part of the whole data flow
- the Sorting phase. Traditionally, the MapReduce framework
adopts the MergeSort algorithm for its simplicity. As the shares
of Map(or combiner)-output have been sorted individually,
MergeSort only needs to merge the sorted shares. However,
as we show next, it leaks vital information about the records
under sorting.
If we look at the block-wise merge process carefully, we can
identify some unusual merging behaviors, which reveals some
sensitive attributes of the processed records. Starting from the
records in each block sorted by the Map phase, the main body
of MergeSort is to merge and sort two individually sorted lists
of records recursively until all records are sorted. Assume
the two merged lists contain the records {Li} and {Rj},
respectively, as shown in Figure 4. If one of the lists has all the
values larger (or less) than the other, the corresponding access
pattern will be continuously reading the blocks in one list first,
followed by the whole list of the other. This pattern may leak
sensitive information for real applications. For example, in the
WordCount program, adversaries might be able to guess the
frequencies of words and derive the word distribution.
Mitigation Methods. This access pattern problem involves
two parts: block-level pattern in untrusted memory and the
page-level pattern in enclave memory. In the following, we
address the block-level patterns only with oblivious sorting
algorithms [3]. The in-enclave page-level patterns will be
discussed later. By definition, regardless of the actual values
in the sorted list, an oblivious sorting algorithm will take the
fixed identical access pattern that is only determined by the
size of the list. In the SGX-MR framework, we implement the
well-known BitonicSort [3] algorithm (See Fig 5. Note that
BitonicSort takes O(N(logN)2) block accesses for N blocks,
compared to MergeSort’s cost O(N logN). Our evaluation
shows although it is more expensive than MergeSort, the
overall cost is still significantly less than MergeSort with
ORAM-based oblivious I/O interface.
BitonicSort
S3 S4 S1 S2 S5 S8 S7 S6
S5 S6S1 S2 S3 S4 S7 S8
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
Sequence 1 Sequence 2
Identical Block
Access Patterns 
Fig. 5: Uniform block access does not leak any pattern in
Bitonic Sort which is oblivious to the data in the blocks. The
figure shows the state of the sorting algorithm in the second
iteration of sorting
1) In-Enclave Page-Access-Pattern Leakage: As previously
discussed, enclave execution is vulnerable to the page-fault
attack [31]. Since the in-enclave processing is around records,
we look at the related record processing. First, the page-fault
attack does not provide additional information for sequential
record accesses in executing the map function and the re-
duce aggregation function. However, we do find some non-
sequential in-enclave access patterns that need to be protected
from page-fault attacks. They include the in-enclave sorting
part of the Sorting phase and the map-output sorting (when
a block is filled up) before combining. The repetitive page
accesses for the same data block reveal the ordering of records
in a pair of blocks, a similar scenario to Figure 4, but
happening at the page level.
Mitigation Methods. At first glance, we can just use the
BitonicSort algorithm to hide the record-level access pattern
(as a result of page-level access leakage) inside the enclave.
However, this is insufficient, as the core operation of this in-
enclave BitonicSort, compare-and-swap, can still be captured
by observing the sequence of page faults and used to reveal the
relative ordering between pair of records. The following code
snippet shows how possibly the access pattern is associated
with the record order.
if (a >= b){
// swap a and b, and
// the page access can be observed.
}else{
// no page access.
}
To avoid this access-pattern leakage, we adopt the oblivious
swap operation applied to different scenarios [7]. The basic
idea is to use the CMOV instructions to hide the page access
patterns. The oblivious swap operation indeed occurs high
K2-V1 K2-V2 K2-V3 K2-V4 K2-V5 K2-V6 K2-V7 K3-V1 K3-V2 K3-V3 .......
Input Blocks
Ouptut Blocks
Reduce
K2-V
Fig. 6: Group-wise aggregation in Reduce phase may leak
group sizes. K2 spread over three blocks. Thus, the access
pattern will be reading three blocks sequentially and then
possibly writing out one block.
cost. We have observed about 2 − 2.5× cost increase for
finishing the Sorting phase.
B. Leakage in Reducing
The Sorting phase will order key-value pairs by the key. As a
result, all pairs will be sorted into groups. The controller will
sequentially read the sorted blocks and transfer the records
containing the same key (i.e., a group of records) to the
reduce function. For aggregation-based reduce functions, each
group will be reduced to one key-value pair. By observing
the input/output ratio, adversaries may estimate group sizes,
as shown in Figure 6 (if Combiners are not presented). In
extreme cases, multiple blocks can be reduced into one record,
which may lead to severe information leakage. For example, it
leaks the word frequencies for the WordCount program, which
helps estimate the word distribution that, in turn, can be used
to guess words.
Mitigation Methods. We consider a simple method to
address the group-size leakage problem. As described in the
previous section, the size difference between the Reducer’s
input and output leaks the group sizes. However, as we
have made the Combiner component mandatory in SGX-
MR thanks to the restricted types of reduce functions, it
helps obfuscate the aggregated result in the reduce phase.
For example, without Combiners, each record in the reduce
phase corresponds to one occurrence of a word (i.e., a key)
in the WordCount program, and the group size reveals the
frequency of the word. With Combiners, each record entering
the Reduce phase may correspond to the pre-aggregate of
multiple records. Thus, counting the records in the Reducer
input does not give a good estimation of actual group sizes.
Note that we do not protect the combining process from page-
fault attacks (e.g., the CMOV-based method) for achieving
better performance, which will possibly expose partial group
sizes. However, adversaries cannot trace back the Reducer
input to the Combiner output to utilize the partial group size
information because the oblivious sorting phase between them
breaks the link entirely. A concern is whether the frequency
of such combiner-output records still preserves the ranking of
actual group sizes. The intuition is that the key of a large
group may be presented in more map outputs than a key of
a small group. We analyzed the observed group size after
adding combiners to check whether the size ranking is till
preserved. Figure 14 for WordCount and Figure 15 for kMeans
both show the ranking of group sizes is not preserved at all.
To completely address the possible ranking leakage, we can
further take one of the two candidate approaches: (1) injecting
dummy key-value pairs by Combiners, e.g., adding (key, 0) for
non-presented keys in the Combiner output for the COUNT
function, or (2) disguising the reduce patterns by padding the
output block with dummy records, e.g., every time an input
block is scanned, output a padded block, regardless of whether
or not the actual aggregation happens. In the following, we
describe the second method in more detail.
load a block;
for each record in the block
if (the end of the group)
write the aggregate record
else
write a dummy record
write the output block
The above process shows the dummy record writing process.
Note that all the records will be encrypted and thus non-
distinguishable. The concern is that the page-fault attack
can catch the execution of the if-else branch, which leaks
the information of writing aggregate or dummy record. To
address this problem, we also apply the CMOV protection
here. Another problem is the increased size of output due to
the added dummy records, which can be a significant cost
for applications like kMeans that have only a few aggregated
records generated. We apply an additional bitonic sorting over
the padded blocks and extract top-k elements to get rid of the
dummy records, so that the group size ranking is still oblivious
to adversaries. In experiments, we will evaluate the additional
costs associated with this method.
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V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Experiment Setup
SGX-MR is implemented with C++ and the Intel SGX SDK
for the Linux environment. Our core framework consists of
only about 2000 lines of code. The entire SGX-MR framework
runs inside the enclave, except a small component in the un-
trusted area that handles block-level read/write requests from
the enclave. The compiled framework without the application
code takes about 1.1MB. To match the design specification,
we have implemented a customized bitonic sort that works
with block-level accesses in the untrusted memory. To protect
record level access patterns in the enclave, we also apply
the bitonic merge operation to obliviously merge in-enclave
blocks. Furthermore, we hide the conditional swaps and sen-
sitive branching pattern by leveraging CMOV instructions.
As described in section 4.2, we have implemented manda-
tory combiners to obfuscate the actual group sizes for the
selected aggregators. The experiments were conducted on a
Linux machine with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-8700K CPU of
3.70GHz processor and 16 GB of DRAM. We use ZeroTrace’s
open-source implementation for our experiments. We use 128-
bit AES-CTR encryption to encrypt the data blocks in the
untrusted memory.
Sample Applications. We use two sample applications in
our evaluation: WordCount and KMeans. WordCount takes
a document collection and output the frequency for each
word. It is an essential tool for language modeling and has
been included in various tutorials as an example of data-
intensive processing. KMeans [14] is a fast, simple clustering
algorithm. It takes the initial cluster centroids and iteratively
conducts the two steps: (1) cluster membership assignment
for each record and (2) the centroid re-computation, until
the clustering converges, where the centroids (or all records’
cluster membership) do not change anymore. In all KMeans
related experiments, we only execute one iteration of this
learning process.
Baseline Implementation. To compare SGX-MR with
ORAM-based approaches, we have implemented ORAM-
based sample applications without depending on the MapRe-
duce framework. In most data analytics programs, aggregating
by groups is one of the most expensive core operations. It
can be implemented with either hashing or sorting (as in the
MapReduce workflow). With ORAM based access-pattern pro-
tection, one may wonder whether hashing can be more efficient
for enclave-based programs. However, processing hash table
in enclave creates page-level pattern [15], [19]. For example,
to update a hash value, we must access the position of the
particular hash key and update its value list. An adversary
can observe this access pattern and possibly figure out the
group size that ORAM cannot help. A few recent studies have
noticed the problems with enclave based hashtable. Taehoon
et al. [15] propose a key-value data-structure for extensive
data, but it still leaks the access pattern of the encrypted keys
on a hash table. Mishra et al. [19] propose an ORAM based
key-value data structure to fully address the access pattern
leakage. However, it takes O(N) complexity to find a key in a
worst-case scenario, and it will take O(N2) computational cost
to find the aggregated results. On the other hand, MergeSort
with ORAM and CMOV takes only O(Nlog2N) to sort the
records, and a consequent linear scan is sufficient to compute
the aggregated results. Thus, in our evaluation, we will take
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Fig. 7: For sequential access over data ORAM incurs signifi-
cant cost overhead compared to SGX-MR.
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Fig. 8: Effect of different block size on ORAM and SGX-MR
sequential access, with a fixed file 30 MB.
MergeSort with CMOV protection for ORAM based baseline
implementations to efficiently address both block and page
level attacks.
B. Performance of Core Operations
Block Access. We started our evaluation with the basic
operations to understand the sources of performance gain for
SGX-MR compared to ORAM. As sequential block accesses
do not provide valuable access-pattern information to adver-
saries, ORAM protection is unnecessary. Figure 7 shows that
ORAM protected block accesses can be 1000x slower than
those without protection. As SGX-MR’s input, output, and
some intermediate steps, are sequential block accesses, we
can utilize this feature to save a significant amount of cost.
Since block size is a critical application-specific factor, we
measured the impact of block size on performance. Figure
8 shows that a larger block size can significantly reduce the
overhead of transferring the same amount of data (30 MB)
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Fig. 9: MergeSort with the ORAM block I/O results in
significantly higher costs than a dedicated oblivious sorting
(e.g., BitonicSort) in SGX-MR. Note: block size = 1 KB.
into enclave. While the block size is increased from 1 KB to
6 MB, the execution time is reduced by about 50 to 100 times
for both ORAM and sequential access. Since the ORAM cost
is affected by the number of blocks, a larger block size reduces
the number of blocks and thus also benefits ORAM.
Sorting. Another key operation in our framework is key-
value record sorting. We have shown that it is necessary
to use oblivious sorting algorithms to protect the important
relationship between keys. We use MergeSort in the ORAM
setting and BitonicSort for SGX-MR in the comparison. In
both solutions, we also used CMOV-based protection for page-
fault attacks. Figure 9 shows that BitonicSort under SGX-
MR is much faster than MergeSort with ORAM for the block
I/O. While the costs of both algorithms are asymptotically the
same, i.e., O(n log2 n), MergeSort+ORAM appears to have
a much high constant factor — it is about five times slower
when sorting 20,000 blocks.
Impact of Enclave Memory Management. The physical
memory allocated for SGX enclaves, called Enclave Page
Cache (EPC), is limited to a small size — enclave applica-
tions can use only about 90 MB. However, the SGX Linux
library can utilize the Linux virtual memory management so
that applications can access the large virtual memory space.
Thus, application developers have two options: either entirely
depending on the enclave virtual memory management, or
manually managing a limited data buffer to minimize the
system intervention. Sergei et al. [2] noticed that when the
data size is small manually managed buffer can cost less than
the enclave virtual memory management as it can reduce the
number of unnecessary page swaps. We revisited this issue and
show that for sufficiently large datasets (e.g., ¿ 90 MB) these
two strategies make not much difference. Figure 10 confirms
that page-fault processing takes a significant amount of time.
We conduct random block accesses over an array passed to
the enclave, which is copied to the enclave heap. When the
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Fig. 10: When allocated buffer size go beyond EPC limit,
system-managed memory incurs significant cost overhead for
random data access. Conversely, sequential access has negli-
gible impact on it.
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Fig. 11: BitonicSort in SGX-MR costs for different memory
management strategies. System-managed memory incurs small
cost overhead compared to application-managed Buffer.
array size exceeds the limit of EPC size, the EPC page fault
handling mechanism is frequently called for random accesses,
which incurs higher costs. However, when working with large
data, swapping EPC memory by either buffer management or
the system paging does not make much cost different. Figure
11 compares BitonicSort with a four-block buffer management
strategy, verses with all blocks loaded into a big array and
managed by the system. The cost difference is negligible.
However, sometimes the application managed buffer might
be desired, e.g., to minimize the memory footprint or better
control memory swapping.
C. Costs of Access-Pattern Protection in SGX-MR
We have discussed several mechanisms to protect the spe-
cific access patterns in SGX-MR. In this section, we design
a set of experiments to fully understand how these costs
contribute to the entire processing costs.
Oblivious Sorting. Figure 12 shows the cost comparison
with access pattern protection (i.e., BitonicSort) vs. without
(i.e., MergeSort) for the WordCount algorithm implemented
with SGX-MR. SGX-MR with BitonicSort is approximately
seven times slower than SGX-MR with MergeSort. Thus, this
cost is significant.
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Fig. 12: SGX-MR with BitonicSort vs. with MergeSort. O-
swap uses CMOV to protect from page-fault attacks. Note:
WordCount with block size = 2 MB
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vs. BitonicSort with/without o-swap.
In-enclave Page-Fault Attack protection. Next, we evalu-
ate the protection of the page-fault attack on oblivious sorting.
Previously, we have shown that protecting access patterns from
untrusted memory is not enough. Even in enclave memory,
page-level access patterns reveal the order of the records in
an oblivious sorting algorithm. As described in section 4, we
applied the oblivious swap technique to protect the order of
the records within each block.
Fig. 12 and 13 show that, compared to ORAM+MergeSort,
the additional cost brought by BitonicSort+o-swap is relatively
small.
0 20 40 60 80 100
100
101
102
103
104
105
Top 100 words ordered by frequency
W
or
d
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Actual Frequency
Observed Frequency
Fig. 14: Observed group sizes before (exactly mapped to word
frequencies) and after adding combiners for WordCount.
1 2 3 4 5
0
1
2
3
4
5
Cluster Id
C
lu
st
er
Si
ze
lo
g
1
0
Actual Size
Observed Size
Fig. 15: Observed group sizes before (exactly mapped to the
cluster size) and after adding combiners for kMeans.
Protecting Group Sizes in Reducing. We have mentioned
that by using Combiners mandatorily in our framework we
can effectively protect from the group-size-estimation attack in
reducing. Figure 14 and 15 how Combiners’ outputs disguise
the actual group sizes. Its well-known that combiners improve
performance as they can significantly reduce the number of
records going to the Reduce phase. We achieved about ×2 and
×7 speedup for WordCount and KMeans respectively. As our
experiments showed, combiners are especially beneficial for
applications with a small number of keys such as KMeans. To
further protect the possibly preserved group size ranking, we
have also evaluated the dummy-record padding method. Table
I shows the storage cost of dummy record padding method
and its post-processing cost to remove dummy records. The
padding will significantly increase the storage cost. However,
with the post-processing step, which approximately doubles
the processing time of the Reduce phase, the size goes back
to the original one, which will not affect the performance of
future processing.
D. Application-Based Evaluation
Finally, we compare the SGX-MR and ORAM implemen-
tations for the sample applications. The SGX-MR WordCount
compiled code has around 1.6MB and the KMeans code has
around 1.5MB. Samples of the Yelp review dataset are used for
evaluating the WordCount algorithm. The KMeans algorithm
is evaluated with a simulated two-dimensional dataset that fills
30 records per 2 KB block and up to 10,000 blocks. We imple-
ment the ORAM-based solutions with the original algorithms
(not in the MapReduce style) and use the ZeroTrace block
I/O interface for accessing data. As we discussed earlier, the
ORAM-based baselines use an o-swap protected MergeSort
for aggregating the records. Figure 16 and 17 show the overall
costs according to the increased data. Overall, the SGX-MR-
based implementations for both applications are significantly
faster than ORAM-based implementations (Table II).
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VI. RELATED WORK
There are several pieces of work related to our study. The
most popular technique for access-pattern protection would
be Oblivious RAM [12]. During the past years, the research
on ORAM [32], [33] has been booming due to the rise
of cloud computing and the privacy concerns over cloud
data store. Tree-based Path ORAM [32] and Circuit ORAM
[33] are among the most efficient schemes. ZeroTrace [27]
uses both Path and Circuit ORAM to address the access-
pattern problem for SGX applications. While using the most
efficient implementation of ORAM, we show that ZeroTrace
https://www.kaggle.com/yelp-dataset/yelp-dataset
TABLE I: Additional Costs by Padding
Application Input Actual Output Padded Output w/o post-processing with post-processing
block block block ms ms
KMeans 10,000 1 1,662 33146 51606
WordCount 10,000 3,997 53,439 1022055 2029600
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Fig. 17: Application Level Comparison of KMeans Problem
TABLE II: Application Level Comparisons of SGX-MR and
ORAM for different applications. Block size = 2 KB, data
size = 20 MB.
Application SGX-MR ORAM
(ms) (ms)
KMeans 33078 516634
WordCount 1022974 4821916
based block I/O still takes a significant overhead over the
regular block I/O. Obliviate [1] also uses the Path ORAM
scheme to design the I/O interface for an SGX-based secure
file system. Similarly, the additional cost is significant. Both
schemes try to design a protection mechanism at the block
I/O level, providing a high level of transparency to application
developers. However, we argue that an application-framework-
level protection mechanism can be more efficient.
Researchers also try to extend big data processing platforms
to take advantage of SGX. The basic idea is to keep the
codebase of current software, such as Hadoop [9] and Spark
[34], unchanged as possible, while moving the data-processing
parts to the SGX enclave. VC3 [28] applied this strategy
for modifying the Hadoop system. It moves the execution
of “map” and “reduce” functions to the SGX enclave, while
the upper-level functions such as job scheduling and data
management still stay outside the enclave. The most part of
the Hadoop Java library is not changed at all. As a result,
it achieves the goal of processing encrypted sensitive data
in enclaves, but leaves other issues, such as access pattern
protection and computation integrity (for the components
running in the untrusted memory area), not addressed.
M2R [10] addresses the problem of access-pattern leak-
age in the shuffling phase of VC3 and proposes to use
the oblivious schemes for shuffling. However, other security
problems are still not addressed. These top-down approaches
have the fundamental problem — unless the whole framework
is re-implemented and moved to the enclave, adversaries can
easily attack the components running in the untrusted area.
Our work is entirely different from these studies. We utilize
the MapReduce to regulate the application dataflow so that
we can apply access-pattern protection mechanisms to the
framework level. Opaque [36] tries to revise Spark for SGX.
They also focus on the data access patterns between computing
nodes and illustrate how adversaries can utilize these access
patterns to infer sensitive information in the encrypted data.
To protect the distributed data access patterns, they provide
four types of primitive oblivious operators to support the
rich Spark processing functionalities: oblivious sort, filter,
join, and aggregation. Noticing the problem of computation
integrity, they try to move the job controller part, formerly
in the master node, to the trusted client-side and design an
integrity verification method to detect whether worker nodes
process data honestly. However, to reuse the most parts of
Spark codebase, it has the most of the system running in the
untrusted area, especially for worker nodes. Thus, the local-
level integrity guarantee and access-pattern protection might
be insufficient. Mostly, it shares the same fundamental problem
with VC3 and M2R, as we mentioned.
VII. CONCLUSION
ORAM has been a popular solution for protecting access-
pattern leakages in SGX-based applications. Yet, it is still very
expensive. Furthermore, since ORAM provides a protection
mechanism for lower-level block I/O, it cannot address the
application-level access-pattern leakage. We also notice that
application-specific data access patterns can take advantage
of alternative oblivious access techniques to improve per-
formance. Thus, we propose the SGX-MR framework to
regulate the dataflow with the MapReduce processing frame-
work, which works for a large class of data-intensive ap-
plications. The regulated dataflow allows us to analyze the
access pattern leakages at each stage and develop solutions for
all applications implemented with the SGX-MR framework.
We have conducted extensive experiments to understand the
features of the SGX-MR. The result shows that SGX-MR-
based implementations of data-intensive applications work
much more efficiently than ORAM-based implementations.
We will continue to optimize the phases of the SGX-MR
framework to achieve even better performance.
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